AUTHORITY, COERCION AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
David A. Lake Despite its central role in theories of international politics, scholars --and especially realist scholars, ironically --have an impoverished conception of power. Focusing almost exclusively on material capabilities and coercion, as the editors suggest, scholars ignore and even actively deny the role of political authority in relations between states. After distinguishing between authority and coercion as two major forms of power, I show that authority is central to variations in sovereignty, hegemonic orders, the conflict between developed and developing states, and the current debate over failed states and international trusteeship.
1 International relations cannot be explained only by material capabilities and coercion. We need to bring authority "back in" to the study of world politics.
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This chapter is more conceptual and synthetic than theoretical or empirical. Elsewhere, I
have used the same conception of political authority briefly summarized below to deduce new propositions about state behavior and test those propositions against historical evidence. 3 Much of the argument in this extension of that work rests on these confirmed theoretical and behavioral regularities. Here, I attempt to demonstrate the importance of authority for world politics by showing how the concept makes coherent previously problematic or incomplete theories of international relations and produces new insights for future research. Thus, the case for authority in international relations is made in this chapter not on its empirical veracity -although this 1 In tribute to Stephen Krasner, these several literatures were selected because of his central role in their development. 2 Bringing authority back in is part of the constructivist challenge to realist scholarship. Nonetheless, constructivists have, by-and-large, not questioned the existence of international anarchy, only its meaning for state practice (see Wendt 1992 Wendt , 1999 . Other constructivists have emphasized the role of moral authority in shaping state practice, which is different from but complementary to the arguments I develop below about political authority (see among others, Reus-Smit 1999 , Finnemore 2003 . See below. 3 Lake 2009. issue fines or other punishments for breaking the law. Noncompliance by itself does not demonstrate a lack of authority.
Authority differs from coercion in being fundamentally a collective or social construct.
Although the social meaning of coercion may vary, as do the social norms governing its use, the physical ability to impose violence on another state exists independently of the selfunderstanding of the actors themselves. With authority, on the other hand, the right to punish noncompliance ultimately rests on the collective acceptance or legitimacy of the ruler's right to rule. As Thomas Hobbes himself recognized, "the power of the mighty (the Leviathan) hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people." 10 Richard Flathman develops this point more fully, arguing that sustained punishment "is impossible without substantial agreement among the members of the association about those very propositions whose rejection commonly brings coercion into play." 11 If recognized as legitimate, the ruler acquires the ability to punish individuals because of the broad backing of others. In extremis, an individual may deny any obligation to comply with A's laws, but if the larger community of which he is part recognizes the force of A's commands and supports A's right to punish him for violating these commands, then that individual can still be regarded as bound by A's authority. 12 Similarly, A can enforce specific edicts even in the face of opposition if her general body of commands is accepted as legitimate by a sufficiently large number of the ruled. In both cases, A's capacity to enforce her rule rests on the collective affirmation and possibly active consent of her subjects. 13 Because a sufficient portion of the ruled accept A and her edicts as rightful, A can employ force against individual free riders and even dissidents. Knowing that a sufficient number of others support the 10 Hobbes 1651 /1962 , quoted in Williams 2006 , 265. 11 Flathman 1980 , 29. 12 Flathman 1980 Bernard 1962, 169; Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, 133. ruler, in turn, potential free riders and dissidents are deterred from violating the rules, and overt force is rendered unnecessary or, at least, unusual. In this sense, political authority is never a dyadic trait between a ruler and a single subject, but derives from a collective that confers rights upon the ruler. As Peter Blau clarifies, from the perspective of the collectivity of subordinates, compliance with authority is voluntary, as subjects confer rights on the ruler. But from the standpoint of any individual subordinate, compliance is the result of "compelling social pressures" rooted in collective practice. As Blau concludes, "the compliance of subordinates in authority relationships is as voluntary as our custom of wearing clothes."
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Although distinct, political authority and coercion are intimately related in the use of violence to enforce commands. 15 The capacity for violence, if not actual violence, is necessary to buttress or sustain authority in the face of incentives to flout rules designed to constrain behavior.
Even as he recognizes that he should comply with A's edicts, any individual may choose to violate any rule. Duty creates only an expectation of compliance, but this does not produce or require perfect obedience. One can cheat on one's taxes, for instance, without calling into question the government's authority to impose taxes. Given incentives by subordinates not to comply in specific instances, the ruler must use violence to enforce edicts and, by example, to deter defection by other subordinates. Especially in large groups where free riding is likely, violence may be necessary to prevent widespread violation of commands and, thus, the erosion of authority.
Despite their analytic differences, authority and coercion are thus hard to distinguish in practice. They are deeply intertwined in their reliance on violence, making it difficult for analysts to conclude whether, in any given instance, a subordinate followed the ruler's command out of 14 Blau 1963, 312. 15 Exclusion is another common means of enforcing political authority. See Lake 2010b. duty or force. What does differ between these two concepts is their social meaning. In political authority, violence is used to enforce rules regarded as legitimate by the community over which it is wielded. In coercion, violence is illegitimate, often itself a violation of rules and, therefore, possibly subject to punishment by some authority. Nonetheless, in any given instance, there is no bright line separating authority and coercion, and I offer none here. 16 This is not a failure of the analysis but rather a reflection of the intimate connection between political authority and coercion.
Political authority is also distinct from other forms of legitimate social influence or power. Although the ruler and her rules must be legitimate to be in authority, other legitimate constraints on human action exist. 17 Social norms are also legitimate -otherwise they would not be norms -and can limit the actions of those subject to those norms. Likewise, expertise can make an actor an authority, with a legitimate right to speak and possibly compel action on issues pertaining to its knowledge. 18 In focusing on authority here, and especially political authority, I
emphasize the ruler's right to issue certain types of limited commands. Thus, in my conception, political authority is an agentic form of power different from other equally legitimate but more disembodied or structural forms of power originating within global civil society discussed elsewhere in this volume.
19

Forms of Authority in World Politics
Political authority arises in many forms. The right to rule has been variously understood to derive from the charisma of individual leaders (charismatic authority), tradition that is socially 16 In Lake 2009,, however, I operationalize the concept of international hierarchy and demonstrate that valid indicators of authority differ from those commonly used to measure international coercive power. See esp. Table  3 .1, p.81. 17 In this way, the phrase "legitimate authority" is redundant, while the phrase "authority is legitimate" is purely definitional. 18 Flathman (1980) famously distinguishes between being in authority and being an authority along these lines. 19 On structural power, see Barnett and Duvall 2005. accepted and reproduced through ritualized ceremony (traditional authority), or religious deities (religious authority). 20 All have played a role in legitimating political leaders and institutions in different historical moments and continue to play a role in the world today. Joseph Nye's notion of "soft power," for instance, is a variant of charismatic authority. 21 In the modern era, however, political authority largely rests on one of two primary foundations: law or, I argue, a social contract.
In formal-legal authority, A's ability to command B, the community of subordinates, and the willingness of B to comply, follows from the lawful position or office that A holds. Weber 1978, 31-38, 215-254 . 21 Nye 2002. 22 Weber 1978, 215-226 . 23 Flathman 1980, 35. 24 On juristic theories of the state, anarchy, and international relations, see Schmidt 1998 . The concept of anarchy is most developed in Waltz 1979. derive from a formal-legal order in the first instance, it must be that authority is compatible with or at least can arise in the state of nature. Thus, it is possible that authority can exist within an otherwise "anarchic" international system.
Relational authority, premised on a social contract, is founded on an exchange between ruler and ruled in which A provides a political order of value to B sufficient to offset the loss of freedom incurred in his subordination to A, and B confers the right on A to exert the restraints on his behavior necessary to provide that order. In equilibrium, a ruler provides just enough political order to gain the compliance of the ruled to the taxes and constraints required to sustain that order, and B complies just enough to induce A to actually provide it. A gets a sufficient return on effort to make the provision of political order worthwhile, and B gets sufficient order to offset the loss of freedom entailed in accepting A's authority. If A extracts too much or provides too little order, B can withdraw his compliance, and A's authority evaporates. In this way, relational authority, contingent on the actions of both the ruler and ruled, is an equilibrium produced and reproduced through on-going interactions.
Even though states lack formal-legal authority over one another, they can and do possess more or less relational authority, premised on the provision of an international order. 25 The terms of any social contract are determined by the outside options of each party as well as prevailing norms of procedural justice and fairness. 26 The ability to project force over distance and create order far from home is necessary for relational authority, and thus typically limits international authority to "great powers," although some limited authority may also be exercised by regional
powers. Yet, international authority in the nineteenth century also rested on norms of racial and cultural superiority that justified and "normalized" global inequalities and permitted European 25 Lake 2009. 26 For a theory of hierarchy, see Lake 1999a. On the importance of justice and fairness in support for authority, see Tyler 1990 and 1995. powers to rule over vast colonial empires. 27 Despite its greater coercive powers today, norms of human equality and national self-determination constrain the United States and limit its authority to spheres of influence or, at most, "empires by invitation." 28 That relational authority rests on the exchange of order for compliance does not preclude the influence of other factors in setting the terms of the social contract. Explaining varying patterns of international authority remains a challenge, long ignored, that can be taken up once the role of authority in world politics is more fully revealed.
International Authority
Scholars of international politics, especially realists, have failed to understand the distinction between coercion and authority and that both are forms of power. The distinction is conceptual, even definitional. They are at one level simply words, as Humpty Dumpty said to
Alice, that mean only what we choose them to mean -"neither more nor less." Limiting conceptions of authority to the formal-legal variety, however, scholars assume that international politics is anarchic or devoid of authority and, thus, focus only on variations in coercive capacity.
Their emphasis on coercion at the expense of authority in world affairs leads to impoverished theory and, at best, incomplete explanations of empirical trends.
Though blurred in reality and hard to discern even through a more analytic lens, the real test of the distinction between coercion and authority is whether it allows us to see better patterns of international politics in the real world. Elsewhere, I have demonstrated that international authority is associated a syndrome of behaviors by both dominant and subordinate states that is not predicted or anticipated by traditional theories that focus only on coercion. 29 In particular, 27 Crawford 2002, Chapter 3. 28 On norms of national self-determination, see Jackson 1990 . The phrase "empire by invitation" is from Lundestad 1990 . 29 commands both by intervening to replace local leaders and ostracizing them from normal political intercourse through sanctions or other barriers to exchange (e.g., the United States and Cuba). Such behavioral patterns are the ultimate measure of the importance both analytically and practically of international authority. Here, however, I hope to show in a review of four distinct literatures that our understanding can also be enriched by recognizing the authoritative nature of some (but certainly not all) relationships in world politics.
Sovereignty: Organized Hierarchy
Sovereignty is a principle defining how authority should be organized within and between states. It rests on three primary assumptions. 30 The sovereign possesses ultimate or final authority over all people and territory in a given realm. That is, within any fixed territory, the sovereign has no authority above him. External actors, in turn, are excluded from possessing or exercising authority over the people or territory of the sovereign. Finally, sovereignty is indivisible, a whole that cannot be shared or divided. Together, these three assumptions imply that authority within a territorially delimited realm must culminate in a single apex at the level of the state. Westphalian or juridical sovereignty is claimed by all states today, even though the 30 Krasner 1999, 9-26; Lake 2009, 45-51. necessary conditions may not actually be satisfied. Moreover, that states are, in fact, sovereign is assumed in many theories of international relations, especially realist approaches.
Revisionists have demonstrated that reality, however, is very different than the principle of sovereignty. Krasner finds that in practice the deviations from assumed sovereignty are sufficiently frequent and significant as to charge the whole as "organized hypocrisy."
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Revisionists explain anomalies in sovereignty largely as product of coercion. See Gilpin 1975 , 1977 , Krasner 1976 , and Keohane 1980 for foundational works. On problems, see Lake 1993. 40 Kindleberger 1973. On the possibility of privileged groups greater than one, see Lake 1984; Snidal 1985 . 41 Gilpin 1975; Krasner 1976; Gowa 1994; Lake 1988 . 42 Krasner 1976; see also Brawley 1999. trade dealt death blows to the theory. 43 The rapid globalization of the world economy after the supposed decline of the United States in the 1970s shut off further work on this approach. In turn, authority is not strictly material and, as a social construct, can persist long after coercive capabilities wane. Authority, of course, requires some coercive capability to protect subordinates and punish violators, as above, but legitimate rule is not related to material capabilities in any one-to-one relationship. Order and authority can be maintained more easily than they are created. Subordinate states "buy into" the hegemonic order and thereby empower the dominant country to use coercion legitimately, which reduces opposition and countervailing coalitions that might otherwise arise and constrain the use of force. Moreover, subordinate (and dominant) states eventually develop vested interests in the authority and order of the hegemon which give them incentives to actively support the dominant state, its efforts, and its uses of force when necessary. In this way, the exchange of order for legitimacy central to relational authority, itself an equilibrium, becomes more robust over time. 47 Order and authority decline, in turn, only when the subordinates withdraw their consent, the hegemon abuses its authority by acting in its self-interest rather than the general interest (as happened in the early 1970s with the Nixon shocks and incipient protectionism and in 2003 in the Iraq War), or the hegemon can clearly no longer provide the required order. Focusing on authority rather than coercion, afterglow is not a theoretical anomaly but an expected feature of hegemonic orders.
47 Lake 2009, 30-33 and 41-43. Finally, understanding the authoritative rather than coercive roots of hegemony also A focus on authority thus resolves many of the theoretical and empirical problems at the heart of earlier, more coercive versions of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability. It builds upon the persistent intuition that power is central to the structure of the international economy, and suggests that the conditions for international economic liberalism are not so different than those for domestic liberalism --and that authority, albeit limited authority, is necessary for both. This rehabilitation of hegemonic stability theory and the continued authority of the United States that it renders visible help explain the continued liberalism of the international economy -even after the 2008 financial crisis, the greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression.
Authority and Dissent: The Third World Against Global Liberalism
The New International Economic Order (NIEO) demanded by developing countries in the 1970s posed a significant challenge to the liberal international order created and led by the United States. Propelled by OPEC's initial success in raising the real price of oil, the NIEO focused attention on global inequality and demanded the "authoritative allocation" of resources, or the political regulation of international trade and finance in explicit opposition to liberal 52 Lipson 2003 . 53 Lake 1999b. markets. 54 The effort failed, subsequently being replaced by the "Washington consensus," which glorified pro-market economic reforms and international openness.
From a focus on coercion, the NIEO is anomalous. The weakest members of the international system sought to rewrite the rules of the international economy, propagated by the United States and other developed countries. It was a bold call for a new redistributive bargain.
The question from this perspective, however, is not why did the NIEO fail but why did the developing states even bother and why did the developed countries take their demands as seriously as they did? Krasner argues, correctly, that the developing countries achieved their limited successes only when they were able to affirm principles of international or juridical sovereignty and exploit the rules of international institutions that gave them voice. 55 This is true as an empirical observation, but ignores the reality that both sovereignty and the rules of international regimes are themselves political institutions largely controlled, as Krasner later showed, by powerful states.
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To see the NIEO as simply redistributive bargaining is to interpret it too narrowly. It was about redistributing the gains from exchange, to be sure, but more fundamentally it was an attempt to challenge the overarching authority of the United States, which depends in large part on subordinates recognizing the legitimacy of the dominant state and its rules. It was the threat of collective defiance and the rejection of the claim that the United States had the right to set the rules of the international economy that made the NIEO so fraught. Even if developing countries got little at the bargaining table --which was the eventual result, foreseen from the very beginning --a collective denial of the authority of the United States both promised to the developing countries an opportunity to participate in writing a new global order and, in turn, 54 Krasner 1985. 55 Krasner 1985 . 56 Krasner 1983 Krasner , 1999 threatened those vested in the current American-led order. The NIEO is more fully understood as a collective act of defiance by otherwise subordinate states.
Like any opposition movement, the Group of 77 backing the NIEO contained both reformers, who wanted to modify the rules, and revolutionaries, who sought to overturn the entire system of authority. This split ultimately weakened the demands for reform. Even the strategies adopted by the G77, however, reflected the pervasive nature of American authority.
The emphasis on sovereignty was not just a bargaining ploy but an attempt to limit America's authority over economic policies of developing states. By insisting on full national sovereignty, and reclaiming national autonomy over their own affairs, developing countries sought to reduce the areas of policy subject to U.S. rule. In turn, postwar international institutions that permitted developing countries to give voice to their demands were designed to create checks and balances on American hierarchy, which they then artfully exploited. 57 These institutions could not be shut down or their members silenced because they served a larger purpose of constraining American authority. In fact, they worked as intended as a safety valve for complaints with American rule that produced cautious reforms on the part of the United States.
Equally important, the NIEO was beaten back because of the support of the community of other subordinates, largely other developed states, that continued to recognize America's authority and support its rules. The best prospect for success by the developing world was to divide and conquer the developed nations, offering special access to their economies in exchange for meeting some or all of their demands. By and large, however, the developed countries remained a solid bloc and continued to support American leadership. Even in natural resources policy, the area where the NIEO went furthest and major producers were able to dangle attractive bilateral deals before consumers, the developed countries maintained a degree of unity. Though 57 Lake 2009, 126-8. they did not succeed in creating a consumer's cartel to break the one maintained by producers, the developed countries did enact an oil sharing regime that considerably blunted OPEC's impact; 58 by the late 1980s the real price of oil had returned to pre-1973 levels. Similarly, preferential trade agreements, like the Lomé Convention, could have torn apart the coalition of developed countries, but in the end merely reinforced prior regional or colonial hierarchies.
Deeply vested in the Pax Americana, Europe and Northeast Asia did not defect to any significant extent. As long as enough other members of a community recognize the legitimacy of a ruler, this empowers that ruler to ignore or even discipline members who challenge its authority.
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With solid backing of other developed countries, who generally benefited from the biases in the American-led international order and possessed significant interests vested in that order, the United States was able to stand firm against calls for fundamental reform of the international economy and, indeed, to ostracize the most vociferous dissidents.
Having defeated the challenge from the NIEO, the United States succeeded in integrating much of the developing world into its international order through the process of globalization and the policies embodied in the so-called Washington consensus. Through the 1990s, countries liberalized their economies both domestically and internationally, with most abandoning failed policies of import-substituting industrialization and capital market restrictions. Even China and India, the largest and most important holdouts from the American-led order, liberalized their economies and became dependent on export-led growth by the end of the century. Today, only a handful of "rogue" regimes dominated by nationalist-religious-protectionist coalitions remain to 58 Walter describes the rebuilding of the state's monopoly of violence as the "critical barrier" to civil war settlement. 66 Perhaps even tougher, however, is rebuilding the legitimacy of the state.
Short of total victory by one side in often multi-sided conflicts, the political differences that led the state to fail must be accommodated by changing the prior institutions and rules, but there is no political foundation on which to build new institutions. In the anarchy that exists after state failure, groups face the enormously difficult task of rebuilding legitimacy in an environment of fear, animosity, and often hate without any established ground rules for political decisionmaking. Rebuilding an authoritative government that has the support of its population is no easy task.
63 Note that the choice to intervene is not the same as the choice to succeed, or to succeed at the level of resources devoted to the goal. Statebuilding may well be beyond the ability of any external power to accomplish successfully. 64 See Stein, this volume. 65 Weber 1978 . See also Lake 2010a. 66 Walter 1997. Outside powers like the United States can sometimes play a catalytic role in statebuilding by setting new rules of politics, developed in consultation with local stakeholders, and enhancing the credibility of this new regime. 67 Statebuilding is analogous to the problem of cycling in legislative majorities. 68 In any multi-dimensional issue space with no established rules and no agenda-setter, there may be no stable equilibrium; one coalition is displaced by a second, which is displaced by a third, which is then possibly displaced by the first, and so on, as witnessed in the on-going political tragedy that is Somalia today. By declaring that this set of rules rather than some other set will prevail, and that it is prepared to defend these rules against challenges, the outside power can create a focal point around which coalitions can stabilize --as with rules of procedure in legislatures, the outside power can "induce" an equilibrium. effective monitoring and oversight provisions, and thus gave trustees a free hand in governing the trust territories for as long as they wanted. 74 Neotrusteeship, as developed after the end of the Cold War, expands this practice by requiring 1) the consent of some recognized body of sovereign states, usually but not always the United Nations Security Council, 2) a specific mandate outlining the purpose of the intervention, 3) stronger oversight mechanisms with periodic reporting and reauthorization, and 4) a limited timetable for withdrawing and restoring sovereignty to the territory or turning the legal administration of the territory over to the United Nations or another international body. By defining and tightly regulating the rights of the trustee, the international community is attempting in practice to solve the problem of failed states while 72 Krasner 1999 . 73 Krasner 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2004. 74 Bain 2003. at the same time limiting the authority of would-be trustees. But it is old wine in new bottles.
Partly because of its roots in past imperial practice, neotrusteeship is still too controversial to be approved by the United Nations in principle. Nonetheless, it is now close to common policy in cases of failed states. As the exception that proves the rule, the United States violated this emergent practice in invading Iraq without the approval of the United Nations. This likely explains why the international community reacted so unfavorably towards the war and, even today, refuses to offer the United States any significant assistance in rebuilding the country.
Ironically, the restrictions that make neotrusteeship acceptable to the international community may also make it ineffective in rebuilding failed states. Based on a limited number of historical cases, scholars have argued that statebuilding attempts that begin early, before the violence has become widespread, are more likely to succeed. 75 But by the time that the international community agrees that a state has indeed failed, it is usually quite late in the process. It is also increasingly recognized that statebuilding is a broad, multidimensional process that requires addressing the problems within society that caused the state to fail in the first place. 76 Narrow and strict mandates, intentionally designed to limit the authority of the trustee, cut against this goal. Finally, as noted, trustees are often most helpful in establishing the credibility of a newly reconstituted state. Limited time horizons and fixed timetables for withdrawal or transition, however, undermine the credibility of the trustee's commitment. Rather than encouraging groups to take the new rules of politics as "given," groups anticipate that the trustee's time is limited and either keep fighting or merely wait for it to depart before contesting the state's authority once again. 77 Given the difficulties of statebuilding in general, finding the 75 Paris 2004; Rotberg 2004 . 76 Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009. 77 Lake and Rothchild 1996. right balance between limits on the authority of the trustees and the authority they need to succeed remains elusive.
The larger point, however, is that the politics of statebuilding and neotrusteeship are not about coercion, which remains highly asymmetric, but are all about how to restore authority within failed states and, in turn, manage authority between states. Nothing suggests more clearly that international politics is not only a realm of "power politics," if by that we mean coercive capabilities, but is also an arena of authority by states over states.
Conclusion
Political realists, subversive or not, 78 have long maintained that international politics are, as Hans Morgenthau subtitled his classic text, a struggle for power. 79 Nothing in this essay challenges this central tenet. Where scholars and realists typically err, however, is in limiting power to material resources and coercive capabilities. Authority is at least an equal form of power. Indeed, given that it is usually easier to gain compliance by obligating others to follow one's will rather than through force of arms alone, 80 authority may actually be a preferred form of power, with coercion coming into play only to defend authority or when authority itself cannot be obtained.
Recognizing the authoritative nature of world politics has profound implications for international relations theory and practice. Assuming that all relations between states are anarchic, realists portray world politics as a Hobbesian state-of-nature, the proverbial war "of everyman, against everyman." 81 As seen even in this brief reconstruction of several literatures, in the pursuit of authority dominant states provide international orders of benefit to subordinates, 78 Keohane, this volume. 79 Morgenthau 1978. Morgenthau added "and peace," but this goal is often overlooked by realists. 80 Levi 1988 . 81 Hobbes 1651/1962. discipline subordinates that fail to comply with the rules of order or challenge their authority, and tie their own hands through multilateralism and other means to commit credibly to limits on their authority. Subordinate states, in turn, typically do comply with the rules of order and accept the dominant state's position as "rule maker" as rightful or legitimate. Although they may not benefit from order to the same degree as dominant states, they still benefit on net compared to their next best alternative --the state of nature. They rely on the protection of the dominant state, and enjoy unusually low defense spending, and open themselves to trade and the benefits of the international division of labor. Seeking autonomy, however, subordinates aim to limit the authority of dominant states over their affairs and try to gain the best bargain they can from its order. Subordinates adopt strategies of resistance and exploit the fetters that dominant states must use to bind themselves. Though a contest for power, international politics are equally a struggle for authority and autonomy.
